Mapping the Irish Policy Space:Voter and Party Spaces in Preferential by Ken Benoit & Michael Laver
IIIS Discussion Paper  
No.82/August 2005
Mapping the Irish Policy Space:
Voter and Party Spaces in Preferential Elections
Kenneth Benoit
Trinity College, University of Dublin
Michael Laver
New York University 
 







Mapping the Irish Policy Space: 




















    Disclaimer 
   Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the IIIS. 
   All works posted here are owned and copyrighted by the author(s).   







Mapping the Irish Policy Space:  





Kenneth Benoit  
Trinity College, University of Dublin 
 
Michael Laver 
New York University 
 
 





In this note we map the Irish policy space, locating both voters and parties on the most salient 
policy dimensions in Ireland. Estimates of the voter locations are based on the Irish National 
Election Survey (INES), conducted in 2002. Estimates of the party positions are based on an 
expert survey of party positions conducted by the authors in late 2002. We show that 
respondent self-placements on a priori policy scales are highly biased and difficult to 
interpret, and we rely instead on building scale positions for respondents from their answers 
to relevant attitude questions in the INES. The results provide a methodological template for 
locating voters and parties in a common space – a significant problem for any analyst who 
wants to create an empirical elaboration of a spatial model of party competition. 
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Spatial models of political competition have been one of the mainstays of political science 
over the past few decades (e.g. Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984, 1990; Hinich and 
Munger 1994, 1997). As Dow (1998) notes, however, despite the increasing theoretical 
sophistication of spatial theories of voting, these are increasingly criticized for not having 
made equivalent contributions to the empirical study of electoral competition. In multiparty 
electoral contexts, furthermore, spatial theory has provided even more limited insight (Laver 
and Schofield 1990; Macdonald et. al. 1991, 1995; Iversen 1994; Merrill 1995; Merrill and 
Grofman 1999). Our aim is to develop new empirical sources for testing spatial models, by 
generating reliable maps both voters and parties in a common policy space. 
Previous efforts to map policy spaces have been limited by a lack of concrete and 
reliable data on comparable locations of parties and voters. The essential problem is that 
estimates of voter and party positions tend to come from different sources, making it difficult 
to map a single common space containing both types of actor. Typical sources of voter 
preferences come from election studies and opinion surveys, while estimates for parties may 
come from elite surveys, content analyses of texts produced by parties, surveys of political 
experts, or estimation of voting returns or patterns. For example, work by Budge and 
coauthors (1987, 2001) uses the content analysis of party manifestos to estimate party policy 
positions. Dow (2001) generated two-dimensional density estimations of voter positions 
based on surveys where respondents indicated their proximity to parties; Dow (1998) used 
similar methods to generate one-dimensional voter density estimates. Other possibilities 
include computerized word scoring of political documents (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003) or 
factor analyses of voting returns (Myagkov and Ordeshook 1998). 
The only way for both sets of estimates to come from the same source is to estimate 
party positions using survey respondent placements of parties on a priori policy dimensions 
and to estimate voter positions from responses to attitude questions in the same survey. The 
problems with doing this are that: 
 
•  Data on survey respondent placements of party positions are far less extensive 
and comprehensive than, e.g., expert survey data on these positions – we are at 
the mercy of those survey questions on party positions that happen to have been 
asked. 
•  As we show below, such placements are so intensely subjective to individual 
respondents that they may or may not form the basis of reliable and valid 
indicators of overall party positions in the space.  
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Some have attempted to draw on separate sources to map voters and experts, but these 
also suffer from related problems. For instance, Schofield et. al. (1998) draw on 
Eurobarometer data for voter positions, and the European Political Parties Middle Level Elites 
survey to estimate party positions. In order to mate the two sources, however, they construct 
policy scales indirectly using factor analytic techniques from batteries of related questions. 
In follows we set out to address this problem in two ways. First we explore ways of 
using the survey placements of party positions. Second we explore ways of mapping expert 
survey estimates of party policy positions into policy spaces defined by voters’ estimated 
ideal points on the same policy dimensions. We do all of this using previously unanalyzed 
data from the Irish National Election Study (INES) and from a new expert survey of Irish 
party positions. Our primary objective is to show how independent sources of party and 
public policy positions can be integrated and mapped onto the same policy space.  
 
MEASURING THE IRISH POLICY SPACE: DATA 
 
Identifying the policy terrain to be mapped for Ireland involves first identifying the most 
salient political dimensions defining the Irish policy space. The data we use are drawn from 
two principal sources, expert surveys taken by the authors in late 2002 and early 2003, and the 
Irish National Election Survey (INES) taken in mid-2002.  
For three key policy dimensions, the INES asked voters to locate both themselves and 
each of the main parties on scales with explicitly defined endpoints. These dimensions 
concerned:  
 
•  economic policy, specifically the trade-off between cutting taxes and increasing 
public spending in areas such as health and education; 
•  “social” policy, specifically the issue of whether abortion should be totally banned or 
made widely available; 
•  Northern Ireland, specifically the issue of whether to insist on a united Ireland 
immediately or abandon this aim altogether; 
 
As we shall see, the economic and Northern Ireland policy dimensions were judged in 
our expert survey to be the two most important in Irish politics in 2002, while the issue of 
abortion has been the subject of a series of bitter and divisive referendum campaigns. The 
INES not only contained self-placement questions on these scales, but also asked respondents 
to locate the political parties on the same scales. We present the estimates of these positions in 
raw form, together with their estimated overall importance for voters, in Table 1.  
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[Table 1 about here] 
Of the three, INES respondents on average thought that the economic policy dimension 
was most important to them personally (“very important” is coded 1, “not important at all” is 
coded 4). The most extreme “cut taxes” end of this 11-point (0 – 10) scale is zero and the 
center is five – thus this scale in effect runs from right to left. Mean placements of party 
positions are all bunched together in the center-left of the scale, ranging from the PDs at 5.52 
to the Labour Party at 6.38. Note that the mean respondent self-placement on this scale is to 
the left of the mean placement of the most left wing party, a matter to which we return The 
ranking of the mean party placements from right to left on the scale (PD, FF, FG, SF, G, Lab) 
tallies with that of our expert survey (see below) except that Labour is on average ranked as 
most left-wing by survey respondents, but a little to the right of the Greens and Sinn Féin by 
the experts. 
The social policy dimension was on average ranked as being more important than 
Northern Ireland policy by survey respondents, a reversal of expert judgments of the relative 
salience of these dimensions. Here the range of mean party placements was slightly larger, 
though these were still very bunched, ranging from a most conservative mean placement of 
4.50 for FF, to a most liberal of 5.41 for Labour. Mean respondent self-placement was at the 
conservative end of the range of party positions, at 4.72. The ranking of the mean party 
placements from conservative to liberal on the scale (FF, FG, G, PD, SF, Lab) tallies with that 
of our expert survey only to the extent of placing FF and FG as the most conservative parties. 
After this, the expert survey ranks the parties (SF, PD, Lab, G). 
On Northern Ireland, given the relatively extreme party placement for Sinn Féin, the 
range of mean party placements is larger than for the other two dimensions. This runs from a 
mean of 1.43 for Sinn Féin at the republican end of the scale, to one of 4.87 for the Greens. 
Mean respondent self-placement was close to the mean position of FF, at 3.98. The ranking of 
parties on this dimension, from the republican end, was (SF, FF, PD, Lab, FG, G). This tallies 
with the expert survey only in placing SF at the republican end of the scale. After this, the 
expert survey ranks the parties (G, FF, Lab, PD, FG). There is thus a contradiction between 
experts and survey respondents on the position of the Greens on this dimension. 
The problem with the respondent party placements is that different respondents “centre” 
the parties at very different points on the same scale, and that this respondent-specific 
centering of the party system is highly biased by the respondents’ self-placements on the same 
scale. Furthermore, different respondents use very different ranges on the scale to locate the 
set of parties. Some use the entire eleven-point scale width; a substantial number of others 
locate all parties at the same position. Consider each of these problems in turn. 
Figure 1 summarizes the first problem, showing the distributions of the mean party 
locations given by each respondent, by policy dimension. Thus the top panel shows that the  
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mean party location of the six Irish parties varied by respondent from 0 to 10 on the 0-10 
scale, that the mean of these mean placements was 5.99, but that standard deviation of these 
means was 1.59. In other words typical survey respondents were generating a “centre” of the 
six party locations on this 0-10 scale of anywhere between 3 and 9. As Figure 1 shows, the 
variability of party system centers for the other two scales was actually greater than this. 
Different survey respondents clearly had very different subjective interpretations of how the 
predefined endpoints of the scales related to the positions of the Irish party system as a whole.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Table 2 summarizes the range between the leftmost and the rightmost party placement by 
each respondent on each of the three scales. For both the economic and social policy scales, 
just over a quarter of all respondents placed all parties in the same position, giving a zero 
range for their party placements. This figure was somewhat lower at 17 percent for the 
Northern Ireland scale. Over two-thirds of all respondents generated a maximum range of 
party placements of three or less on the 11-point economic and social policy scales. 
[Table 2 about here] 
In a nutshell, raw mean party placements on the three policy scales investigated by the 
INES are aggregates of a series of individual judgments by respondents that are both highly 
bunched and with highly variable centers. One way to try and fix this problem is to 
“standardize” party placements for each respondent, rescaling these to have a mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of unity. This sacrifices all information on different subjective views 
by different respondents about how the same set of parties stood on some policy dimension. 
What is preserved are the relative positions of the six parties and the respondent on each 
dimension.
1 
Aggregating these standard scores gives a summary of individual respondent judgments 
of the relative placements of the six parties on each dimension. These are reported in Table 3, 
and result in considerably “crisper” and more differentiated summary of the relative positions 
of each party on each dimension. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Figure 2 reports the self-placements of survey respondents, rescaled in exactly the same 
way as the party positions in Table 3. These rescaled respondent self-placements are thus on 
the same scale as the “standardized” party placements. As Figure 2 shows, these now look 
quite well-behaved and it at least seems possible we have a common policy space for both 
voters and parties.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
THE EXPERT SURVEY RESULTS 
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Essentially, the problem with using survey respondent judgments about party policy positions, 
as we have seen, is that they are intensely subjective – with scores highly biased by the 
respondents’ self-location on the scale in question. This was addressed above by 
standardizing each respondent’s scores for each scale, in effect removing all substantive 
content from scale positions and preserving only the relative positions of parties on each 
scale. An alternative response is to take each survey respondent’s self-location on each policy 
scale at face value, and attempt to place party policy positions on these scales using some 
external data source. There are a number of possible external data sources, but here we use a 
new expert survey we recently conducted as part of a 47-country comparative study. This 
involved sending out an e-mail invitation to participate in a web-based survey that asked 
country specialists to locate political parties on 10 issue dimensions. This methodology 
followed that of Laver and Hunt (1992) who conducted similar (postal) expert surveys in 22 
countries. The Irish survey invitation was sent from October 2002 to February 2003 to 70 
Irish expert respondents drawn from the membership list of the Political Studies Association 
of Ireland. A total of 54 respondents completed the questionnaire. The mean expert scores, 
along with other summary information are given in Table 4. 
[Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
In addition to specific questions on policy (discussed below), the questionnaire asked 
each country specialist to locate parties on a general “left-right” dimension. The results are 
shown in Figure 5 and show that, from left to right, Irish parties range from the Greens on the 
left, followed by Sinn Féin and Labour, through Fine Fáil and Fine Gael in practically the 
same position, to the Progressive Democrats on the right. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
In addition to locating each party on each policy dimension, respondents were asked to 
indicate the relative importance of the dimension to each party. Table 5 reports these ratings, 
in a manner similar to that of Table 4. The last column of Table 5 also shows the overall 
salience of each policy dimension in the Irish context, weighting each party’s mean salience 
score for each dimension by its vote share in the 2002 Irish general election (last row). The 
two most salient policy dimensions in this sense, as we have noted, were economic policy and 
Northern Ireland. In what follows, because we have good survey information with which to 
compare alternative data sources, we concentrate upon economic, Northern Ireland, and social 
policy. The endpoints of the relevant expert scales were as follows: 
 
Economic policy 
Promotes increasing taxes to increase public services. (1) 
Promotes cutting public services to cut taxes. (20) 
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Northern Ireland policy 
Opposes permanent British presence in Northern Ireland. (1) 
Defends permanent British presence in Northern Ireland. (20) 
 
Social policy 
Favors liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. (1) 
Opposes liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. 
(20) 
 
We now set out to derive the best possible estimates of the distribution of voter ideal points 
on these same scales.  
 
MAPPING VOTER IDEAL POINTS IN THE EXPERT SURVEY POLICY SPACE 
The distribution of voter ideal points on economic policy 
The first task in mapping voters into the same policy space as the expert survey scales is to 
match question wordings and dimension meanings as closely as possible. This is not as easy 
as it looks because of a small but crucial difference between the wordings of expert survey 
and INES scales. As we have seen, the INES used an 11-point (0-10) scale to collect 
respondent self-placements on a range of issues, but only asked for respondent placements of 
party positions for three policy dimensions. The “taxes vs spending” dimension was one of 
these, but the endpoints of the scale for the INES question were as follows: 
 
Government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services. (0) 
Government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social 
services. (10) 
There is a huge difference between these endpoints and those of the 20-point expert 
scale. This difference was introduced to make the question meaningful to mass survey 
respondents as opposed to academic political scientists, but was substantively unfortunate in 
the context of a 2002 Irish election for which the poor performance of the public health 
service was one of the top election issues. Any party proposing to “cut taxes a lot and spend 
much less on health” would have been committing electoral suicide. Table 1 has already 
shown us the unusual pattern that respondents located themselves to the left of the most left-
wing party on this scale. While relative party positions on the INES scale may well remain 
valid, the precise wording, in the context of the 2002 election, means that the health-oriented  
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substance of the INES scale is nothing like the substance of the expert survey scale on 
economic policy more generally. 
Accordingly, we looked elsewhere in the INES for a more general economic policy scale 
and constructed one from three closely related survey items on which respondent self-
placements (but not respondent locations of parties) were collected. The three items were: 
 
(B44.1) Business and industry should be strictly regulated by the State (0). 
Business and industry should be entirely free from regulation by the State (10). 
 
(B44.3) Public or semi-state companies are the best way to provide the services people 
need (0). Private enterprises are the best way of providing the services people need (10). 
 
(B44.4) Most of business and industry should be owned by the State (0). Most of business 
and industry should be privately owned (10). 
 
Combining these three items into an additive Likert scale generated a 0-30 left-right 
economic policy scale with good scale reliability.
2 Figure 4 shows the distributions of 
respondent self-placements on this scale, comparing this with the much more highly skewed 
distribution of self-placements on the arguably flawed “tax cuts vs public spending” scale. We 
therefore take this new “public vs private” scale as our best indicator of voter positions on 
economic policy. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
The distribution of voter ideal points on Northern Ireland policy 
As with economic policy, the INES survey scale dealing with Northern Ireland on which 
respondents also located party positions – “insist on a United Ireland now vs abandon the aim 
of a United Ireland altogether” is not the one that best corresponds with the substance of the 
scale used in the expert survey. Much closer in substance are two 7-point attitude items asking 
for respondent self-placement: 
 
(A12.3) The long term policy for Northern Ireland should be to reunify with the rest of 
Ireland.  
(A12.4) The British government should declare its intention to withdraw from Northern 
Ireland at a fixed date in the future.
3 
If these scales are added together they form a 2-14 scale of respondent self-placements 
on Northern Ireland policy that is substantively very similar to the expert survey scale.
4  
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Figure 5 shows the distribution of respondent self-placements on this new Northern Ireland 
policy scale. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
The distribution of voter ideal points on “social” policy 
The INES did not ask questions on euthanasia, but it did on abortion and homosexuality. 
These questions, asking for respondent self-placement on two 0-10 scales, were: 
 
(B44.5) Homosexuality is never justified. (0) Homosexuality is always justified. (10)  
(C25.1) There should be a total ban on abortion in Ireland. (0). Abortion should be freely 
available to any woman who wants to have one. (10) 
If these scales are added, they form a well-behaved 0-20 scale of respondent self-
placements on social policy which corresponds closely to the substance of the expert survey 
scale.
5 Figure 5 also shows the distribution of respondent self-placements on this social policy 
scale 
 
COMPLETING THE MAP OF THE IRISH POLICY SPACE 
Fitting Voter Densities to Expert Locations of the Parties 
 
Using these INES scales of voter policy positions, we mapped survey respondents into two-
dimensional spaces. The mapping technique used a bivariate kernel density estimation 
procedure to produce contour maps of the regions of highest concentration.
6 Figures 6-7 show 
these density graphs, with the darker regions indicating the areas of highest voter 






Figure 6 represents the two-dimensional plot for the two most salient policy dimensions—
economic policy and Northern Ireland. Figure 7 plots voter densities in a policy space defined 
by economic and social policy. 
Overlaid on each graph are our expert survey estimates of party policy positions. 
Dividing these points are dashed lines showing two-dimensional Drichlet or Voronoi 
tessellations. These lines show the spatial boundaries between any pair of parties, with the 
interior regions thus showing the area of the policy space that is closer to one party than to 
any other. By considering the densities of the voter positions within each tessellation interior 
we can see whether winning parties are indeed occupying the regions of highest vote density 




Our mapping of the Irish policy space makes three contributions. First, we draw on the new 
INES to describe and analyze the locations of the Irish voters on the most salient policy 
dimensions, providing new information on the Irish electorate, including two-dimensional 
contour maps of the Irish electorate. We show that respondent-self placements on these scales 
are highly biased and, while we can partially correct this with a form of standardization, we 
then lose all substantive policy content. The approach we use instead is to develop new 
synthetic scales from respondents’ answers to batteries of attitude questions. Second, we 
present previously unreported results of an expert survey of Irish party policy positions, and 
showing how these may be used to “tessellate” the policy space into policy regions closer to 
some party than to any other. These results map Irish parties and voters into a common space, 
and form a methodological basis for implementing spatial models in the Irish context, as well 
as many others for which a common space is required and voter positions on a priori scales 
used in expert surveys of party policy can be estimated by scaling responses to attitude 
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Table 1: Mean self-placements, and placements of main Irish parties, on three a priori 
policy dimensions, INES 2002.  
 
N Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
N. Ireland (United Ireland 0)
Sinn Féin 2226 0 10 1.43 2.489
Fianna Fáil 2186 0 10 3.90 2.305
Self 2476 0 10 3.98 2.728
Prog. Dems 1921 0 10 4.43 2.211
Labour 1816 0 10 4.69 2.004
Fine Gael 2024 0 10 4.76 2.188
Greens 1590 0 10 4.87 2.098
Importance (1 = very) 2643 1 4 2.21 .871
Abortion (Total ban 0)
Fianna Fáil 1915 0 10 4.50 2.444
Fine Gael 1774 0 10 4.64 2.173
Greens 1406 0 10 4.69 2.345
Self 2498 0 10 4.72 3.548
Prog. Dems 1647 0 10 4.88 2.240
Sinn Féin 1273 0 10 4.91 2.653
Labour 1623 0 10 5.41 2.328
Importance (1 = very) 2589 1 4 2.04 .888
Tax v spend (Cut taxes 0)
Prog. Dems 1847 0 10 5.52 2.114
Fianna Fáil 2012 0 10 5.86 2.079
Fine Gael 1889 0 10 5.94 1.919
Sinn Féin 1439 0 10 6.04 2.222
Greens 1614 0 10 6.05 1.942
Labour 1814 0 10 6.38 2.042
Self 2496 0 10 6.47 2.467
Importance (1 = very) 2637 1 4 1.72 .713
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Table 2: Ranges of party placements on three 0-10 scales 
Range of party placements on “cut taxes (lo) vs increase spending (hi)” 
 




Valid .00 689 25.9 33.5 33.5
1.00 164 6.2 8.0 41.5
2.00 250 9.4 12.2 53.7
3.00 279 10.5 13.6 67.2
4.00 239 9.0 11.6 78.9
5.00 198 7.4 9.6 88.5
6.00 106 4.0 5.2 93.7
7.00 57 2.1 2.8 96.5
8.00 36 1.3 1.7 98.2
9.00 12 .4 .6 98.8
10.00 25 1.0 1.2 100.0
Total 2055 77.2 100.0
Missing System 608 22.8
Total  2663 100.0
 
Range of party placements on “ban abortion (lo) vs make available (hi)” 
 




Valid .00 730 27.4 37.3 37.3
1.00 187 7.0 9.6 46.9
2.00 204 7.7 10.4 57.3
3.00 226 8.5 11.6 68.9
4.00 186 7.0 9.5 78.4
5.00 197 7.4 10.1 88.5
6.00 84 3.2 4.3 92.8
7.00 62 2.3 3.2 95.9
8.00 30 1.1 1.5 97.4
9.00 19 .7 1.0 98.4
10.00 31 1.2 1.6 100.0
Total 1957 73.5 100.0
Missing System 706 26.5
Total  2663 100.0
 
Party placements on “insist on united Ireland (lo) vs abandon (hi)” 
 




Valid .00 455 17.1 19.5 19.5
1.00 78 2.9 3.3 22.8
2.00 112 4.2 4.8 27.6
3.00 221 8.3 9.5 37.1
4.00 269 10.1 11.5 48.6
5.00 474 17.8 20.3 68.9
6.00 251 9.4 10.7 79.6
7.00 194 7.3 8.3 88.0
8.00 133 5.0 5.7 93.7
9.00 66 2.5 2.8 96.5
10.00 83 3.1 3.5 100.0
Total 2336 87.7 100.0
Missing System 327 12.3
Total  2663 100.0 
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Table 3: Aggregates of the relative party positions, “standardized” for each respondent 
 






Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic
PD 1282 -2.04 2.04 -.3091 .0247 .88420
FF 1421 -2.04 2.04 -.0942 .0233 .87657
FG 1316 -2.04 2.04 -.0261 .0207 .75270
SF 951 -2.04 2.04 .0588 .0335 1.03326
G 1088 -2.04 2.04 .1014 .0257 .84701










Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic
FF 1303 -2.04 2.04 -.2483 .0258 .93271
FG 1172 -2.04 2.04 -.2048 .0226 .77279
G 926 -2.04 2.04 -.0576 .0292 .89003
PD 1096 -1.92 2.04 .0662 .0227 .75246
SF 831 -2.04 2.04 .1083 .0361 1.04105






“Insist on united Ireland now (lo) vs abandon (hi)”, standardized for each respondent 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic
SF 1976 -2.04 2.04 -1.1647 .0220 .97692
FF 1911 -2.04 2.04 .0204 .0143 .62709
PD 1676 -2.04 1.92 .2605 .0135 .55370
LAB 1590 -1.79 1.95 .3533 .0137 .54452
FG 1771 -2.04 2.04 .3912 .0130 .54856






Table 4. Positions of Irish Parties on Policy Dimensions from 2002 Expert Survey 
 
   Party 
  (Mean, SE, N) 
Policy dimension  SF  GR LB FG FF  PD 
        
Left-Right 6.3  5.8 7.4 12.7 13.2  16.3 
  0.58 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.28 
  53 52 54 54 54 54 
        
Economic 4.8  5.7 6.5 12.4 13.7  17.4 
  0.31 0.28 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.24 
  51 52 53 54 54 53 
        
N. Ireland  1.5  8.7 9.1 10.9 6.3  11.0 
    0.19 0.40 0.35 0.47 0.37 0.44 
  53 42 52 53 53 52 
      
EU Neutrality  17.6  17.4 9.7 5.0 7.2  6.8 
  0.51 0.53 0.53 0.38 0.48 0.45 
  50 53 54 54 54 53 
        
EU  Enlargement  12.0 9.8 5.7 5.3 7.1 6.7 
  0.74 0.76 0.42 0.50 0.54 0.53 
  46 50 53 53 53 53 
        
EU  Strengthening  16.9 16.9 10.2 8.3 12.6 13.2 
  0.47 0.51 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.56 
  53 52 54 53 53 52 
        
Immigration 8.9  6.1 6.9 13.0 14.8  14.2 
  0.68 0.44 0.49 0.44 0.41 0.54 
  41 50 52 52 53 53 
      
Social  9.6 5.7 6.1 11.3 14.7 7.0 
  0.61 0.47 0.37 0.51 0.34 0.46 
  50 51 54 54 54 53 
        
Environment 10.1  2.4 9.5 13.7 15.9  15.4 
  0.63 0.24 0.44 0.37 0.38 0.44 
  38 54 54 53 54 53 
        
Decentralisation 7.0  4.8 8.8 11.8 13.0  11.9 
  0.58 0.47 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.53 
  40 52 50 49 54 50 
        
Sympathetic 15.7  8.7 6.9 11.1 13.1  13.4 
  0.70 0.61 0.59 0.65 0.59 0.81 
  52 52 52 52 52 51 
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Table 5. Importance to Irish Parties of Policy Dimensions from 2002 Expert Survey 
 
   Party 
 (Mean,  SE) 
Policy dimension  SF  GR LB FG FF  PD  OVERALL
         
Economic  11.3 12.3 15.5 13.6 13.6 17.9  13.9
  0.69 0.66 0.41 0.37 0.49 0.26  1.4
         
N. Ireland  19.6  7.1 11.0 12.3 15.6  10.1  13.9
    0.12 0.67 0.45 0.45 0.35 0.47  3.0
         
EU  Neutrality  15.3 17.2 12.8 12.9 11.3 10.3  12.4
  0.66 0.45 0.43 0.38 0.46 0.53  1.8
         
EU Strengthening  12.8  16.8 11.8 12.4 11.7 13.2  12.3
  0.66 0.33 0.35 0.45 0.46 0.43  1.2
         
EU  Enlargement  9.4 12.9 12.3 13.4 11.5 11.9  12.0
  0.67 0.60 0.47 0.48 0.55 0.51  1.2
      
Immigration 9.0  11.6 12.9 11.1 12.2 12.8  11.6
  0.63 0.57 0.42 0.52 0.55 0.54  1.1
         
Social  7.7 11.3 13.9 11.1 10.7 12.4  11.1
  0.58 0.67 0.53 0.53 0.61 0.57  1.6
         
Environment  8.4 18.7 11.3 10.6 10.5 10.5  10.8
  0.75 0.43 0.51 0.48 0.63 0.66  2.0
         
Decentralisation 8.6  13.4 10.2 10.4 10.2 9.1  10.3
  0.74 0.65 0.53 0.49 0.52 0.57  0.9
      
Party Voting Weight  7.3%  4.3% 12.1% 25.3% 46.6% 4.5% 
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Figure 1: Mean respondent placements of six Irish parties on three policy dimensions 
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Figure 3: Party Positions on the general left-right dimension. Estimates of party positions 
come from an expert survey of political party positions taken from November-February 2002-
2003. 
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Public vs private provision (B44.1 + B44.3 + B44.4)
28.5 25.5 22.5 19.5 16.5 13.5 10.5 7.5 4.5 1.5













Taxes vs spending: left vs right (Flipped C27.1)
10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0












Figure 4: Distributions of respondent self-placements on “public vs private” and 
“spending vs tax cuts” economic policy scales 
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N. Ireland: unionist vs republican (A12.2 +A12.4)
14.0 12.0 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0













Social policy: lib vs con (Flipped (B44.5 + C25.1))
19.0 17.0 15.0 13.0 11.0 9.0 7.0 5.0 3.0 1.0












Figure 5: Distributions of respondent self-placements on Northern Ireland and “social” 
policy scales  
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Figure 6: Irish Voters and Parties in Two-Dimensional Policy Space: Economic v. 
Northern Ireland. Voter estimates are based on rescaled response items from the Irish 
National Election Study. The economic score is a scale of three questions B44.1 + B44.3 + 
B44.4, rescaled to the 1-20 metric; the Northern Ireland score is the inverted sum of A12.3 
and A12.4 (1-7), rescaled to the 1-20 metric. Estimates of party positions come from an expert 
survey of political party positions taken from November-February 2002-2003. Contour 




































Figure 7: Irish Voters and Parties in Two-Dimensional Policy Space: Economic v. 
Social. Sources same as Figure 1; the social score for voter estimates is the inverted sum of 
B44.5 and C25.1 (0-20), rescaled to the 1-20 metric. 
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APPENDIX: QUESTION WORDING 
 
a)  Expert Survey  
 
Instructions: For each policy area, please indicate your judgment of the policy position of 
each political party. Please do this by writing the party abbreviation from the attached list near 
the scale position of this party, then drawing a line from this abbreviation to the position on 
the scale that you feel best sums up the position of the party. 
  
Economic 
Promotes increasing taxes to increase public services. (1) 
Promotes cutting public services to cut taxes. (20) 
 
Social  
Favors liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. (1) 
Opposes liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. (20) 
 
Northern Ireland 
Opposes permanent British presence in Northern Ireland. (1) 
Defends permanent British presence in Northern Ireland. (20) 
 
Environment 
Supports protection of the environment, even at the cost of economic growth. (1) 
Supports economic growth, even at the cost of damage to the environment. (20) 
 
Immigration 
Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into Irish society 
(1) 




Favors the extension of the EU to include new member states. (1) 
Opposes the extension of the EU to include new member states. (20) 
 
Left-Right 
On a general scale of left to right, how would you place this party? Left (1) Right(20)  
 
b)  Irish National Election Survey  
 
Economic (Public v. Private) 
On this card I have a number of opposing statements. People who agree fully with the 
statement on the left would give a score of ‘0’. People who agree fully with the statement on 
the right would give a score of ‘10’. Other people would place themselves somewhere in 
between these two views. Where would you place yourself on these scales?  
(B44.1) Business and industry should be strictly regulated by the State (0). 
Business and industry should be entirely free from regulation by the State (10). 
(B44.3) Public or semi-state companies are the best way to provide the services people need 
(0). Private enterprises are the best way of providing the services people need (10). 
(B44.4) Most of business and  industry should be owned by the State (0). Most of business 
and industry should be privately owned (10). 
 
Economic (Taxes v. Spending – Not Used!)  
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I would like you to look at the scale from 0 to 10 on this card.  A ‘0’ means government 
should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services, and ‘10’ means 
government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services.  
Where would you place yourself in terms of this scale? 
(C27.1) Government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services. 
(0) 






On this card I have a number of opposing statements. People who agree fully with the 
statement on the left would give a score of ‘0’. People who agree fully with the statement on 
the right would give a score of ‘10’. Other people would place themselves somewhere in 
between these two views. Where would you place yourself on these scales?  
(B44.5) Homosexuality is never justified. (0) Homosexuality is always justified. (10) 
[inverted] 
(C25.1) There should be a total ban on abortion in Ireland. (0). Abortion should be freely 
available to any woman who wants to have one. (10) [inverted] 
 
Northern Ireland 
I will now read out a series of statements.  These cover a range of different areas and topics 
and I would like you to tell me how strongly you Disagree or Agree with each.  For each 
statement I read please tell me whether or not you (1) Strongly Disagree; Disagree; Slightly 
Disagree; Neither Agree nor Disagree; Slightly Agree; Agree; or Strongly Agree. (7) 
(A12.3) The long term policy for Northern Ireland should be to reunify with the rest of 
Ireland. [inverted] 
(A12.4) The British government should declare its intention to withdraw from Northern 
Ireland at a fixed date in the future. [inverted] 
 
Environment 
On this card I have a number of opposing statements. People who agree fully with the 
statement on the left would give a score of ‘0’. People who agree fully with the statement on 
the right would give a score of ‘10’. Other people would place themselves somewhere in 
between these two views. Where would you place yourself on these scales?  
(B44.8a) We should protect the environment even if this damages economic growth. (0) 
We should encourage economic growth even if this damages the environment.(10) 
 
Immigration 
(A12.1) There should be very strict limits on the number of immigrants coming to live 
in Ireland (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). 
(A12.6) Asylum seekers should have the same rights to social services as Irish people 
(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). [inverted] 
 
EU 
On this card I have a number of opposing statements. People who agree fully with the 
statement on the left would give a score of ‘0’. People who agree fully with the statement on 
the right would give a score of ‘10’. Other people would place themselves somewhere in 
between these two views. Where would you place yourself on these scales?  
(B44.2) Ireland’s membership of the European Union is a bad thing. (0) Ireland’s 
membership of the European Union is a good thing. (10) [inverted] 
(B44.6) European unification has already gone too far (0). European unification should 
be pushed further (10). [inverted]  
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1 Obviously, this transformation cannot be performed for respondents who located all parties 
at the same policy position, since the standard deviation of their party locations is zero. 
2 Cronbach’s alpha = 0.541; lower if any item deleted. 
3 In each “strongly disagree” is coded 1. Thus low scores on the scale represent a unionist 
position, high scales a republican position. 
4 The INES scale should be inverted  to ensure both scales run substantively in the same 
direction 
5 Once again the scale must be inverted given the substance of the survey questions. 
6 The R statistical package using a customized version of the hdr2d add-on package was used 
to compute these graphics. The density estimations involve several smoothing parameters and 
we tested the graphics under a wide range of these. The representations presented here 
represent our judgment of the best balance between informative detail and noise reduction; 
they are also consistent with smoothing parameters previous bivariate density plots (e.g. 
Schofield et. al. 1998; Dow 2001). Details and code are available from the authors or in the 
replication dataset for this paper (available from the authors). Institute for International Integration Studies
The Sutherland Centre, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland